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In this paper, we present a quantum-key-distribution (QKD)-based quantum private query (QPQ) protocol utilizing single-photon
signal of multiple optical pulses. It maintains the advantages of the QKD-based QPQ, i.e., easy to implement and loss tolerant. In
addition, different from the situations in the previous QKD-based QPQ protocols, in our protocol, the number of the items an honest
user will obtain is always one and the failure probability is always zero. This characteristic not only improves the stability (in the
sense that, ignoring the noise and the attack, the protocol would always succeed), but also benefits the privacy of the database (since
the database will no more reveal additional secrets to the honest users). Furthermore, for the user’s privacy, the proposed protocol
is cheat sensitive, and for security of the database, we obtain an upper bound for the leaked information of the database in theory.
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1 Introduction
The applications of quantum mechanics have achieved great
success in mutual trusted private communication, for which
quantum key distribution (QKD) can allow two parties who
trust each other to generate a secret key over a public channel
with “unconditional” security [1–3]. In the last three decades,
mutual trusted private communication has been fully devel-
oped both in theory [1–12] and in experiment [13,14]. While
in some cryptographic communications, we need not only
protect the security of the transmitted message against the
outside adversaries, but also the communicators’ individual
privacies against each other [15–18]. An interesting exam-
ple is the problem of private query to a database, where Al-
ice (the user) wants to get an item in Bob’s database, which
is composed of a quantity of secret messages. In this sce-
nario, Alice does not want Bob to know which item she is
interested in and Bob does not want Alice to get more items
of his database. Symmetrically private information retrieval
(SPIR) [19] protocols are designed for such circumstance. It
ensures the privacies of both Alice and Bob. That is, after
the communication, Alice can correctly obtain precisely one
item (i.e., the one Alice wants to get) from Bob’s database
and simultaneously, Bob does not know the address Alice has
retrieved.
Quantum private query (QPQ) is the quantum scheme for
SPIR problem. Similar to the two-party quantum secure com-
putations, the task of SPIR cannot be achieved ideally even in
its quantum version [20]. More practically, the aim of quan-
tum private query is generally loosened into that Alice can
elicit a few more items than the ideal requirement (i.e, just
one item) in the database, and Bob’s attack will be discov-
ered with a non-zero probability by Alice if he tries to obtain
the address Alice is retrieving (equivalently, Alice’s privacy is
guaranteed in the sense of cheat-sensitive instead of an ideal
one).
In 2008 V. Giovannetti et al. proposed the first quantum
private query protocol [21–23], where the database is repre-
sented by an unitary operation (i.e. oracle operation) and it is
performed on the two coming query states. In 2011 L. Olejnik
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presented an improved protocol where only one query state
is needed [24]. Compared with the previous (classical) SPIR
schemes, the above two protocols not only exhibit advantage
in security (i.e. security based on fundamental physical prin-
ciples instead of assumptions on computational complexity)
but also display an exponential reduction in both communica-
tion complexity and running-time computational complexity.
Though the above two protocols have significant advan-
tages in theory, they are difficult to implement because when
large database is concerned, the dimension of the oracle oper-
ation will be very high. To solve this problem, M. Jakobi et al.
gave a new private query protocol based on quantum oblivi-
ous key transfer (QOKT) [25].This type of QPQ protocol is
called QKD-based QPQ [25] or QOKT-based QPQ [26]. The
previous QKD-based QPQ protocols can be generally divided
into the following three Stages.
(1) States transfer (Raw oblivious key distribution). Al-
ice and Bob generate a raw oblivious key satisfying: (a) Bob
knows the whole key; (b) Alice only knows part of it; (c) Bob
does not know which bits Alice knows.
(2) Post-processing (Oblivious key dilution). Alice and
Bob “dilute” the raw oblivious key into a final oblivious key
satisfying: (a) Bob knows the whole key; (b) Alice knows
only one (or a little more than one) bit; (c) Bob does not know
which bit Alice knows. Note that the key dilution stage in all
the previous QKD-based QPQ protocols would fail with a
small probability and if it happens, Alice and Bob have to
restart the whole protocol. And generally, to make the above
failure probability smaller, the expectation of the number of
the bits Alice gains is always larger than one, which is actu-
ally not in Bob’s favor.
(3) Private Query. Alice claims a shift to the final key
according to the item she wants to query. Then Bob encrypts
his database by the shifted final oblivious key and sends the
whole encrypted database to Alice. Thus Alice will know
exactly the bit she is interested in.
Compared with the previous QPQ protocols, the above
type of QPQ protocol, i.e., QKD-based QPQ, is easy to be
realized. More concretely, it can be easily generalized to
large database, and it is loss tolerant. Therefore, as a practical
model, QKD-based QPQ is very attractive and has become a
research hotspot. Different manners to distribute the raw key
were given in Refs. [27–33], and different methods for post-
processing were presented in Refs. [34, 35] and analyzed by
us in Ref. [26]. What’s more, recently, people start to study
the error-correction scheme for the QOKT [26, 36].
Inspired by a recently proposed QKD protocol [37] utiliz-
ing single-photon signal of multiple optical pulses, we pro-
pose a QPQ protocol here. As a QKD-based QPQ protocol,
it maintains the original advantages, i.e., easy to implement
and loss tolerant. (Note that the single-photon signal of mul-
tiple optical pulses sources have good experimental founda-
tion, for instance the multi-mode W-state has been generated
and precisely characterised [38, 39]). Besides, different from
the situation in the previous QKD-based QPQ protocols, the
number of the bits an honest user (Alice) knows in the ini-
tially generated oblivious key (i.e., the raw oblivious key in
the previous protocols) is always one. Therefore, no more
key dilution process is required here, and consequently there
is no more failure probability for our protocol. This char-
acteristic not only improves the stability, in the sense that,
ignoring the noise and the attack, the protocol would always
succeed, but also benefits the privacy of the database since
the database owner (Bob) will no more reveal additional se-
crets to the honest users (Alice). Moreover, in all the previous
QKD-based QPQ protocols, only some specific attacks to the
database are analyzed. Differently, here we calculate an up-
per bound for the leaked information of the database in the
proposed protocol in theory. What’s more, like all the previ-
ous QPQ protocols (not only the QKD-based ones), our pro-
tocol is also cheat sensitive, in the sense that if Bob tries to
steal the information on which item Alice is querying, he will
not give Alice the item precisely and, therefore, Alice could
detect Bob’s cheating by the incorrect data value.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The proto-
col is presented in next section. In section 3, we analyze both
the database security and the user security of the proposed
protocol. And a short conclusion is given in section 4.
2 Quantum Private Query Utilizing Single-
Photon Signal
2.1 Bit sharing process utilizing single-photon signal of
multiple pulses
Recently, utilizing a single-photon state of L optical pulses,
Sasaki et al. proposed a QKD protocol without monitor-
ing signal disturbance, which has high tolerance of bit er-
rors. Here we introduce a variant of the bit sharing process
in Sasaki et al. protocol, where the realization condition is a
little more idealized than that of the original version.
a Bob generates a L-length binary string S and a single-
photon state of L optical pulses |Ψ0〉, where the only
photon might be equiprobably in each of the pulses.
Here,
S = s0 s1 · · · sL−1, (1)
where si = 0 or 1, i = 0, 1, · · · , L−1; and
|Ψ0〉 =
1√
L
L−1∑
k=0
|k〉, (2)
where the photon is in the k-th pulse for state |k − 1〉.
Then according to S , Bob modulates the phase of each
pulse and the state changes into
|ΨS 〉 =
1√
L
L−1∑
k=0
(−1)sk |k〉. (3)
Then Bob sends |ΨS 〉 to Alice.
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b Alice generates a random value r ∈ {1, 2, · · ·L−1} in
advance. When she receives |ΨS 〉, she first splits each
pulse by a half beam-splitter and then, according to r,
she changes the order of the pulses in one of the light
paths into
r, r + 1, · · · , L − 1, 0, 1, · · · , r − 1, (4)
while the order of the pulses in the other light path re-
mains
0, 1, · · · , r − 1, r, r + 1, · · · , L − 1. (5)
Then she superposes the pulses in the two light paths
in order. According to the measurement result (i.e., in
which pair of pulses he denotes an photon and the inter-
ference result), she will get one of the following values
(if no eavesdropping and noise exist)
si⊕Lr ⊕ si, (6)
where i = 0, 1, · · ·L−1, ⊕ denotes summation modulo
2 and ⊕L denotes summation modulo L.
c If Alice gets the interference result of the (i0+1)-th pair
of the pulses (i.e., the value of si0⊕Lr ⊕ si0 ,), she pub-
lishes i0 and r. Alice and Bob agree on that the shared
key bit in this round is just si0⊕Lr ⊕ si0 .
We denote the processes presented above as Protocol I.
The more concrete content about Sasaki et al. QKD proto-
col, for example the security analysis and the implementation
scheme in practice, please refer to the Ref. [37]. Here we will
not dwell on it since this paper only covers this novel coding
scheme described above.
2.2 The proposed oblivious key distribution protocol
Utilizing single-photon signal of multiple pulses, we can dis-
tribute a oblivious key which is very suitable for the QPQ
problem. Our QPQ protocol (denoted as Protocol II) for an
N-element database utilizing single-photon signal of multiple
optical pulses is as follows.
1 Bob generates a single-photon state of N+1 optical
pulses |ΨS 〉 according to an (N+1)-bit binary string S
(just like the state in Eq. 3),
S = s0, s1, s2, · · · , sN , (7)
and
|ΨS 〉 =
1√
N + 1
N∑
k=0
(−1)sk |k〉, (8)
where sk is randomly 0 or 1, and k=0, 1, 2, · · ·N. Then
he sends |ΨS 〉 to Alice in sequence.
2 Alice generates a random value r ∈ {1, 2, · · ·N}, and
then she uses the interference circuits in Fig. 1 (just as
what Alice does in Step b in Protocol I) to randomly
get one of the following values
s j ⊕ s j⊞r, (9)
where j = 0, 1, · · ·N, ⊕ denotes summation modulo 2
and ⊞ denotes summation modulo N+1. For ease of
description, we suppose the value Alice finally gets is
st ⊕ st⊞r . (10)
Note that Alice got the interference result of the (t+1)-
th pair of the pulses in two paths.
BS1
BS2
012345· · · 6N−1N
0
1
2
Circuit1. Length: N+1.
(only for the first r pulses)
Circuit2. Length: r.
(for all pulses)
D1
D0
rr+1r+1r+1· · ·N0· · ·r−3r−2r−1
0123· · ·N−rN−r+1· · ·N−2N−1N
The interference process
Figure 1 Alice’s information extraction process: After splitting the pulses
of |ΨS 〉, Alice sets up two circuits in the two light paths according to r, re-
spectively. One, Circuit 1, is with the length of N + 1 pulses and this circuit
only works for the first r pulses, i.e., the rest pulses will take shortcut without
Circuit 1. The other, Circuit 2, is with the length of r pulses and all pulses in
this light path will go through it. Thus, Alice can get interference results of
the two-way pulses in the way shown in the bottom half of the figure.
3 Alice publishes t and they agree on the N-bit key
st ⊕ s0, st ⊕ s1, · · · , st ⊕ st−1,
st ⊕ st+1, · · · , st ⊕ sN−1, st ⊕ sN . (11)
Note that Alice knows st ⊕ st⊞r.
4 According to the position of the bit Alice knows in the
N-bit key above and the position of the item she wants
to query, Alice claims a shift to the key. For example,
if Alice knows the j-th bit in the key and wants to re-
trieve the i-th item in Bob’s database, she declares a
shift value s= j−i so that Bob can shift his key by s.
5 Bob shifts the key according to the value Alice de-
clared. Then he encrypts his database by the shifted
oblivious key and sends the encrypted database to Al-
ice.
6 Alice decodes the item she wants to query by the
shifted oblivious key.
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In Protocol II, Alice always knows precisely one bit in the
oblivious key, therefore, the protocol would always succeed
if no attack and noise exist, and Bob no more needs to leak
additional information about his database to the honest Alice.
In addition, to verify Bob’s honesty, Alice could periodi-
cally check the validity of the received data in other database,
or query to the same item repeatedly and compare the out-
comes [24]. Another way, similar to the first QPQ proto-
col [21], they would perform Protocol II twice at one query
process, denoted as Protocol II′, where Alice is allowed to
query the same item twice to check Bob’s honesty. In fact,
the two ways to verify Bob’s honesty above are both based on
that if Bob gains information on the bit position Alice knows
in the key, he will lose information on the bit value she has
recorded [25]. And the latter (Protocol II′) appears more ac-
tive since Alice might detect Bob’s dishonest action immedi-
ately, however, it leaks more information on the database to
the dishonest Alice.
2.3 Correctness of the proposed protocol
Now we analyze how each single-photon signal of multiple
optical pulses Bob sends to Alice evolves in the whole pro-
cesses of Protocol II. The initial state is as that in Eq. 8.
When the signal passed Alice’s first half beam-splitter BS1, it
changed into
1√
2(N + 1)

N∑
k=0
(−1)sk |k〉 |0〉 + i
N∑
k=0
(−1)sk |k〉 |1〉
 , (12)
where the state |0〉 represents the photon is in the transmission
path and |1〉 represents the photon is in the reflection path.
After passing the two delay circuits and the two reflectors, it
becomes
i√
2(N + 1)

N∑
k=0
(−1)sk |k〉 |0〉 + i
N∑
k=0
(−1)sk⊞r |k〉 |1〉
 . (13)
After the two shifted pulses passes through the second half
beam-splitter BS2, the state becomes
i
2
√(N + 1)

N∑
k=0
[(−1)sk − (−1)si,k⊞r ] |k〉 |1′〉
+i
N∑
k=0
[(−1)sk + (−1)sk⊞r ] |k〉 |0′〉
 , (14)
where the state |0′〉 represents the photon is in the light path
leading to the detector D0 (i.e., the transmission-reflection
path and also the reflection-transmission path), and |1′〉 repre-
sents the photon is in the light path leading to the detector D0
(the transmission-transmission path and also the reflection-
reflection path). We can see that if sk=sk⊞r, Alice might de-
tect the photon in D0 but never detect it in D1, and corre-
spondingly if sk,sk⊞r, she might detect the photon in D1 but
never detect it in D0. Therefore, once Alice detect the pho-
ton at (t+1)-th pair of the pulses, she can know the value of
st ⊕ st⊞r.
3 Security analysis of the proposed protocol
3.1 Database security
It is difficult to figure out a specific attack strategy for Alice
to steal more information of Bob’s database. Here we calcu-
late an upper bound of a dishonest Alice’s information about
Bob’s database by the Holevo bound. That is
H(A : Database) 6 H(A : S ) (15)
6 S ( 1
2N+1
2N+1∑
k=1
|Ψk〉 〈Ψk |) − 12N+1
2N+1∑
k=1
S (|Ψk〉 〈Ψk |)
Here, S (ρ) represents the Von Neumann entropy of the
state ρ, H(A : Database) denotes the amount of information
that Alice can gain about Bob’s database, H(A : S ) denotes
the amount of information that Alice can gain about Bob’s bi-
nary strings S , and each |Ψk〉 denotes one of the 2N+1 different
scenarios of the states in Eq. 8. And we have
S ( 1
2N+1
2N+1∑
k=1
|Ψk〉 〈Ψk |) = S (IN+1) = log(N + 1), (16)
S (|Ψk〉 〈Ψk |) = 0. (17)
Therefore,
H(A : Database) 6 H(A : S ) 6 log(N + 1). (18)
(Obviously, H(A : Database) 6 2 log(N + 1) for Protocol II′.)
This upper bound is lower than that of the previous QKD-
based QPQ protocols when a very large database is consid-
ered. For example in the QPQ protocol in Refs. [25, 27],
the average information Alice can get for each bit in the fi-
nal key can be described by a constant δ if Alice stores the
qubits corresponding to the same bit in the final key and per-
forms collective measurements to them (which is just a spe-
cific attack strategy and there might be some more power-
full attacks, for example, to perform collective measurements
to the whole received photons together), and consequently
she can get Nδ information about Bob’s database in total.
And when N become larger, the advantage of our protocol’s
bound B1 6 log(N + 1) would be highlighted comparing with
B2 > Nδ in Ref.s [25, 27].
3.2 User privacy
Just as in the previous QPQ protocols [21, 24, 25, 27], the se-
curity of user’s privacy in our protocols is based on that if Bob
gets some effective information on which item Alice queries,
he might give Alice the wrong value of the queried one, and
Alice would detect Bob’s attack by the incorrect item.
Firstly, we consider that Bob sends Alice a pure state of
single photon with N + 1 pulses as follows
|ΨA〉 =
N∑
k=0
ak |k〉, (19)
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where
∑
k |ak|2 = 1. (The signals with 2 or more photons will
be detect by Alice’s interference circuits.) When the above
signal passes the two half beam-splitters, it becomes
1
2
N∑
k=0
[
(ak + ak⊞r) |k〉
∣∣∣0′〉 + i(ak − ak⊞r) |k〉 ∣∣∣1′〉]. (20)
Thus, if Alice chooses r, she will get the photon at the (k+1)-
th pair of pulses with the probability
1
2
(|ak|2 + |ak⊞r|2). (21)
The joint probability distribution of different r and k is
[
1
2N
(|ak|2 + |ak⊞r|2)
]
r,k
, (22)
where r=1, 2, · · · ,N and k=0, 1, 2, · · · ,N. And the minimum
probability of Bob giving a wrong value to Alice is
Pmin =
N∑
k=0
min
{ |ak + ak⊞r|2
4N
,
|ak − ak⊞r|2
4N
}
. (23)
Obviously, |ΨA〉 should be prepared with the condition ai =
±a j for all i and j, if Bob wants to give Alice the item she is
querying precisely. Ignoring the overall phase, it is just the
legal state |ΨS 〉 in Eq. 8.
Now we consider that Bob prepares an entangled state
and sends part of it to Alice. To give Alice the correct
item, Bob must know every phase difference st ⊕ s j where
j = 0, 1, . . . ,N, since r is generated randomly by Alice and j
could be any of the natural numbers no bigger than N except
t. Therefore, the state he sends to Alice must in the following
form
2N∑
i=1
λi|Λi〉B|ΨS i〉A, (24)
where
∑
i |λi|2 = 1,
|ΨS i〉 =
1√
N + 1
|0〉 +
N∑
k=1
(−1)si,k |k〉
 , (25)
〈ΨS i |ΨS j〉 , 1 for i , j, and 〈Λi|Λ j〉 = σi j. In the above
equation, each value of i is corresponding to one of the 2N
different states |ΨS i〉. Note that, ignoring the overall phase,
|ΨS i〉 is the same with
|Ψ′S i〉 =
1√
N + 1
−|0〉 +
N∑
k=1
(−1)si,k⊕1|k〉
 . (26)
Then Bob sends Alice the second half of the state in Eq. 24,
i.e., system A, and keeps the first, i.e., system B. After Alice
has measured A, he can measure B in bases {|Λi〉}Ni=1 to get the
value of S i, according to which he can give the correct value
of the item she wants to query. However, by doing this, he
will get no information about which item Alice has queried.
Or he can make other measurements on system B to steal the
above position information, but thus he cannot get the whole
information about S i and, therefore, he cannot give Alice the
correct value all the time. So our protocol is also cheat sensi-
tive just as the previous ones.
For example, Bob may prepare the entangled state
∑
s0,s1,...,sN
|s0〉0|s1〉1 . . . |sN〉N
(∑N
k=0(−1)sk |k〉A
)
√
(N + 1) × 2N
, (27)
where Bob keeps the first N+1 systems {0, 1, . . . ,N} and
sends system A to Alice. When Alice has measured system A
and published part of the measurement results t in Step 2 and
3, the whole system for Bob collapsed into a mixture state
with the ensembles of pure states
{1
2
, |ϕ+〉t,t⊞r
⊗
i,t,
i,t⊞r
|+〉i ⊗ |t0′〉A;
1
2
, |ψ+〉t,t⊞r
⊗
i,t,
i,t⊞r
|+〉i ⊗ |t1′〉A}, (28)
where,
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) , (29)
|ϕ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) , (30)
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 + |10〉) . (31)
If Bob measures the first N+1 system in Z basis, he can give
the correct item to Alice. While he can measure them in X ba-
sis, and if he gets the result |−〉=1/
√
2(|0〉−|1〉) in system t⊞r,
with the probability 1/2, he would get Alice’s privacy. Thus,
he will totally lose the information on the bit value of the key.
And Alice would detect Bob’s cheating with the probability
1/2.
4 Summary and conclusion
In this paper, utilizing the new encoding style by single pho-
ton for multiple optical pulses, we proposed a QKD-based
QPQ protocol, which, we think, has the following advan-
tages.
• It maintains the advantages of the QKD-based QPQ,
i.e., easy to implement and loss tolerant.
• The failure probability is always 0. The proposed
protocol is more reliable compared with the previous
QKD-based QPQ protocols, in the sense that, ignoring
the noise and the attack, it would always succeed.
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• The number of items an honest user will obtain is al-
ways 1. Therefore, it is more reasonable compared
with the previous QKD-based QPQ protocols, since
Bob will no more reveal unexpected secrets to the hon-
est Alice.
For the security of the database, we have calculated an up-
per bound for the leaked information of the database in the-
ory. This upper bound is lower than the previous QKD-based
QPQ protocols, however, it is larger than that of the ones in
Refs. [21, 24]. And correspondingly, the implementation dif-
ficulty of our protocols is also between them. That is, Bob
does not need to perform a collective unitary operation on a
very large quantum system, however, the single photon signal
with N+1 pulses is more difficult to prepare than the single
photons. For the privacy of the user, our protocols are also
cheat sensitive as the previous ones, since once Bob tries to
get the address of the item which Alice is querying, he cannot
give the correct item to Alice precisely and Alice could detect
Bob’s cheating by the incorrect data value.
In conclusion, the proposed protocol is the first QKD-
based QPQ protocol without the process of the oblivious key
dilution, and, therefore, it is the first QKD-based one with no
failure probability and no information reveal for the database
when the user is honest. Therefore, we think the proposed
protocol initiates a new branch of QKD-based QPQ. And we
hope that the contents of this paper would be both interesting
and instructive to the researchers who are working on quan-
tum private query and the related fields.
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